《近代史研究》2006年第4期
2020-10-21 10:33:44   来源：中国社会科学院近代史研究所    点击：

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一、中文目录

较量：东北解放战争的最初阶段 金冲及（1）
毛泽东与红军的赣湘进军 何友良（29）
重析福建事变中共应对方针 黄道炫（49）
湖南农民运动中“左”的错误及其影响 梁尚贤（64）
土地改革中的农民心态：以1937—1949年的华北乡村为中心 李金铮（76）
民国时期乡村建设运动的农村改造模式 虞和平（95）
晚清昭信股票发行过程论略 李 玉（111）
“量中华之物力，结与国之欢心”新解 王开玺（128）
名实·政治·人事——关于民初上海商人团体史研究的几点思考 冯筱才（134）
近10年李大钊研究的进展及相关问题的讨论 吴汉全（146）
书讯《嘉庆以来汉学传统的衍变与传承》 

 

 

二、中文内容提要

较量：东北解放战争的最初阶段　　金冲及 (中央文献研究室研究员)
［内容提要］在东北解放战争的最初阶段,国共双方进入这个原本比较陌生的地区后,都面对许多复杂的未知数和变数,因而多次变更原有的决策和工作部署。共产党领导的军队先入东北,但处境仍十分艰难。国民党军队在进攻初期拥有显然优势。经过九个多月的反复较量和检验,共产党实行“让开大路,占领两厢”的方针,把工作重心放在放手发动群众、建立巩固的东北根据地上,终于站稳了脚跟,为下一阶段扭转整个东北局势奠定了基础。
［关键词］国共关系|解放战争|东北|中苏关系

 

毛泽东与红军赣湘进军　　何友良（江西省社会科学院当代研究所研究员）
［内容提要］仅从中共党内路线斗争的框架认识毛泽东与1930年红军的赣湘进军，有较大的局限性。这次进军，是毛泽东等在长期思考形势、生存与发展问题的基础上，对历史机遇的主动把握，从正反两方面丰富了农村包围城市道路的思想。进军还提供了熟悉实际情况而又富有思想见地的地方领导者在面对上级错误决策时，如何去就取舍的行为模式，是中共历史上第一次在中央犯错误时，成功避免全党一起跟着犯错误的范例。进军对国民党当局也产生了重要影响，到1930年冬形成一个全面动员的“围剿”态势，国共斗争进入更加激烈的大军冲杀阶段。
［关键词］毛泽东|赣湘进军|战略思考|历史影响

 

重析福建事变中共应对方针　　黄道炫（中国社会科学院近代史研究所副研究员）
［内容提要］中央苏区第五次反“围剿”期间，福建发生反蒋事变。面对这一重大变故，中共心态十分复杂，公开表态和实际做法也有相当距离。应该说，福建事变爆发后，中共内部对尽可能保住十九路军这一反蒋力量尚有共识，在军事上也给予了一定帮助。但在当时背景下，红军和十九路军的共同作战尚难实现，中共设想的战争计划是在江西趁国民党军之虚，以红军主力出击南昌一线，既围魏救赵，又扩大自己。这种一石数鸟的计划，是当时中共顾虑多种因素、应对复杂形势的产物，体现着一个理论依赖颇强的年轻政党面对复杂形势的困惑与抉择。
［关键词］闽变|十九路军|蒋介石|中共

 

 

湖南农民运动中“左”的错误及其影响　　梁尚贤（中国社会科学院近代史研究所编审）
［内容提要］湖南农民运动在斗争高潮中形成了一股“左”的浪潮。中共湖南区委从1926年11月起，就采取了若干措施，纠正“左”的错误，收到了一定的效果，情况一度有所好转。但从1927年2月起，湖南区委经不起这股强大的“左”的浪潮的压力，不仅停止了纠“左”，而且自己也跟着“左”起来了。湖南区委的转向，使农民运动中的过火行为越发不可收拾。过火行为主要是农民和基层农会干部自发搞起来的，但共产党人的领导不力，指导不当，更助长了农民的过火行动。共产党对湖南农民运动指导上的失误，主要表现在：指导思想上，存在崇拜群众运动的自发性和狂热性的倾向；斗争策略上，任意扩大打击面；思想方法上，犯了绝对化、片面性的错误。湖南农民运动“左”的错误，给革命全局造成了极其不良的影响，激起了两湖地区的反革命叛乱，从而加速了国共合作的破裂。
［关键词］湖南农民运动|共产党|过火

 

 

土地改革中的农民心态：以1937-1949年的华北乡村为中心　　李金铮（南开大学历史学院教授）
［内容提要］以往关于土地改革的研究主要限于简单的“政策——效果”模式，忽视了乡村社会尤其是农民大众的心态、行为及其与土地改革的互动关系。1937－1949年华北乡村土地改革的历史表明：本来给农民带来巨大利益的土地改革，并没有立刻燃起农民的热情之火，他们往往胆小怯懦，不敢立即起来响应。为此，中共从改造传统的民俗伦理入手，通过“挖穷根”、“斗争大会”等方法，激发农民对地主阶级的被剥削感、阶级对立意识、革命斗争意识和拥护中共的意识。在此基础上，一向温和、忍让的中国农民将整个地主阶级打翻在地的复仇情绪宣泄到极点。不仅如此，其传统的平均主义心态不再限于打倒地主阶级的“均贫富”，而是发展为部分贫苦农民侵犯中农利益的绝对平均主义行为。在此贫富错位的社会裂变中，农民传统的发家致富心态转变为既渴望富裕、又惧怕富裕冒尖的矛盾心态，甚至不惜将现有的财产挥霍浪费。总之，在中共土地政策的影响下，农民的传统心态历经空前的激荡和改造，同时一些传统心态也在延续和放大。
［关键词］华北抗日根据地|解放区|土地改革|农民心态

 

 

民国时期乡村建设运动的农村改造模式　　虞和平（中国社会科学院近代史研究所研究员）
［内容提要］民国时期的乡村建设运动，就其所设想和实施的具体内容而言，是一种旨在全面改造传统农村的模式探索，其内容包括对农村政治、农业经济和农民素质的现代性改造。当然，从当时的时代背景和实际成效来说，乡村建设运动存在着不少缺陷，更不能成为乡村建设派所期望的解决近代中国问题的根本之路。但是，它改造农村的一些思想认识和具体做法，既把改造农村问题作为中国现代化进程的关键问题，又企图寻找一条改造农村的有效途径，在农村政治改造方面力图实行民主自治制度，在农业经济改造方面试图推行具有企业化和市场化性质的股份合作体制，在农民素质改造方面企图培养初具现代文化科技知识的“新农民”，从而显示了一种比较系统的具有一定现代化意义的农村建设模式，这应该是值得我们深思和认真研究的。
［关键词］乡村建设|农村改造|乡村自治| 合作社|乡村教育

 

晚清昭信股票发行过程论略　　李玉（南京大学中华民国史研究中心副教授）
［内容提要］晚清昭信股票虽然经过政府高层的细致设计，但在实际发行过程中发生了巨大变异：在官场演变为报效，在民间则以摊派为主。虽然报效股票的官员可以得到行政奖励，但民间认购者则基本上“本利全无”，得到的只有对昭信股票“失信”的怨忿和对政府信用的极度怀疑。昭信股票的结局，再次说明“有治法无治人”是晚清改革难以取得成效的重要原因。
［关键词］晚清|昭信股票|公债|失信

 

“量中华之物力，结与国之欢心”新解　　王开玺（北京师范大学历史学系教授）
［内容提要］1901年2月14日，清廷颁谕称：今后将“量中华之物力，结与国之欢心”。人们多认为此语表示清廷将最大限度地满足列强的要求，出卖国家与民族利益。此解似误。就清廷本意而言，并非最大限度地出卖国家与民族利益，而是在确保其政治统治的前提下，与列强磋磨交涉，以尽可能少的“中华之物力”，去“结与国之欢心”。尽管如此，并不影响学界有关清政府已经成为“洋人的朝廷”，成为帝国主义统治中国人民的走狗与工具的传统评价。
［关键词］中华之物力|与国之欢心|最大限度|最小代价

 

名实·政治·人事——关于民初上海商人团体史研究的几点思考　　冯筱才（复旦大学历史学系副教授）
［内容提要］上海商人团体在民初中国历史上具有特殊地位，它们因此也成为研究者们的重要关注对象。史学界目前正遭遇一些新的理论范式及方法论、史料观等带来的冲击，上海商人团体历史的书写也面临新的挑战。根据既有对史料与文献的研究，此一研究领域大概可在以下几个问题上有所加强：（1）认真考察商人团体“名与实”的问题；（2）注意“政治”在商人团体史研究中的重要性；（3）增强对“人事”的考量。同时，研究者也要注意问题意识的创新及史料扩充等。
［关键词］上海商人团体|研究方法|名实|政治|人事

 

近十年李大钊研究的进展及相关问题的讨论　　吴汉全（徐州师范大学历史文化与旅游学院教授）
［内容提要］近十年是李大钊研究的深入发展时期，李大钊与同时代人物关系的研究、李大钊与文化关系的研究、李大钊学术思想的研究、李大钊与近代中国社会演进关系的研究取得重要进展。这一时期的李大钊研究成果说明，李大钊研究在深化，李大钊也由比较单一的政治人物向具有复杂历史内涵的近代社会人物转变，反映李大钊研究工作者的社会研究的大思路。今后的李大钊研究，要对业已形成的研究领域进一步“深耕细作”，更新李大钊研究的观念，改进李大钊研究的方法，调整研究者自身的知识结构，进一步加强学术研究交流，从而使李大钊研究进一步走向深化。
［关键词］李大钊研究|中国近现代史| 学术史|综述

 

 

书讯

《嘉庆以来汉学传统的衍变与传承》 

 

 

三、英文目录提要

Morern Chinese History Studies
No.4, 2006

 

Contestation: The Early Period of the Liberation War in Manchuria Jin Chongji (1)
During the early period of the Liberation War in Manchuria, when the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang entered this unfamiliar region, both parties faced many complicated variables and unknowns. Therefore, they made many changes to their original strategies and operational deployments. Though the CCP army entered the region first, they were still in a difficult situation. The Guomindang army had clear superiority in the early stages of their attack. After repeated contests and trials over more than nine months, the CCP implemented a policy of “giving up the highways and occupying the countryside”. They put their emphasis on unreserved mobilization of the masses and building a solid Manchurian base area. In the end, they gained a firm foothold and laid the foundation for turning around the whole Manchurian situation in the next phase of the war.

Mao Zedong and the Red Army’s Advance into Jiangxi and Hunan He Youliang (29)
Trying to understand Mao Zedong and the Red Army’s 1930 advance into Jiangxi and Hunan just within the framework of the Chinese Communist Party’s internal policy struggles has great limitations. This advance was an active seizure of an historical opportunity on the part of Mao Zedong and others, based on their long consideration of issues of survival, development and the overall situation. It enriched the strategic principle of “encircling the cities from the countryside”, and also provided local leaders—who knew the situation on the ground well, and had a lot of insightful ideas—with a behavioral model of how to make choices in the face of their superiors’ incorrect strategies. This was the first example in the history of the CCP of successfully preventing a mistake on the part of the Central Committee from being followed by the party as a whole. The advance also exerted a great influence on the Guomindang authorities, and resulted in the Guomindang army being totally mobilized to encircle and suppress the CCP army in the winter of 1930. From then on, the struggle between the Guomindang and the CCP entered a more intense phase of large-scale military conflict.

A Re-analysis of the Chinese Communist Party’s Response to the Fujian Incident Huang Daoxuan (49)
During the Central Soviet Area fifth struggle against the “encirclement campaign”, an anti-Chiang Kai-shek movement broke out in Fujian. The Chinese Communist Party’s attitude toward this momentous event was very complicated, and its public declarations were very different from its real activities. It would be fair to say that after the outbreak of the Fujian Incident there was still a consensus within the CCP that the Nineteenth Route Army should be preserved as an anti-Chiang force to whatever extent possible, and indeed the CCP provided it with a certain amount of military assistance. However, considering the background of the time, it was very difficult for the Red Army and the Nineteenth Army to fight side-by-side. The CCP was planning to take advantage of weakness of the Guomindang army in Jiangxi to attack the Nanchang line with the main force of the Red Army, thereby forcing the Guomindang army to call off its attack in order to defend its base, and allowing the Red Army to expand its forces. This plan to kill several birds with one stone was the product of careful consideration of many elements on the part of the CCP in response to a very complex situation. It reflects the bewilderment of a young and heavily theory-dependent political party when faced with a complex situation, and the choice with which it was faced.

The Hunan Peasant Movement’s “Leftist” Mistakes and Their Influence Liang Shangxian (64)
At its climax, the Hunan peasant movement formed a “leftist” tidal wave. Beginning in November 1926, the Hunan Regional Committee of the Chinese Communist Party adopted some measures to correct “leftist” mistakes, which were effective and remedied the situation for a time. However, under the pressure of this strong “leftist” tidal wave, the Regional Committee not only stopped rectifying “leftist” tendencies, but turned “leftist” itself. The turning of the Regional Committee made the extreme acts of the peasant movement spin further and further out of control. Though the radical acts were initiated by peasants and cadres of the grass-root peasant associations, lack of strong leadership and correct guidance from members of the CCP was also one of the driving forces behind them. The errors in the CCP’s guidance of the peasant movement can be summarized as follows: in its guiding principles, it had a tendency to worship the spontaneity and fanaticism of the mass movement; in its strategy for the struggle, it enlarged the struggle’s scope recklessly; in its theoretical approach, it made the mistakes of absolutism and one-sidedness. The “leftist” mistakes of the Hunan peasant movement resulted in damage to the revolutionary cause, triggered off anti-revolutionary revolts in Hunan and Hubei provinces, and thereby accelerated the splitting apart of the cooperation between the CCP and the Guomindang.

The Peasant Mentality during Land Reform: Centered on Rural North China, 1937-1949 Li Jinzheng (76)
Past studies of land reform have been mainly limited to the “policy-effect” model, ignoring the mentality and behavior of rural society, particularly of peasants, and their interactions with land reform. The history of land reform in rural North China shows that land reform—which would have brought great benefit to peasants—did not immediately ignite the peasants’ ardor. They were cowardly, not daring to rise in immediate response. Therefore, starting with the reform of traditional ethics, the Chinese Communist Party tried to excite the peasants’ sense of being exploited by landlords, their consciousness of class opposition, their sense of revolutionary struggle, and their support for the CCP, by means of “digging up the roots of poverty” and “public struggle meetings”. With this foundation, the hitherto mild and submissive Chinese peasants gave full vent to their vengeful desire to overthrow the entire landed class. Furthermore, their traditional sense of equalitarianism was no longer merely limited to the idea of “leveling the rich and poor” to bring down the landed class, but developed into extreme equalitarian actions where some poor peasants infringed on the interests of middle peasants. In this social fission and dislocation of poverty and wealth, the peasants’ traditional mentality of trying to build up their family fortunes changed into a contradictory mentality of craving for wealth on the one hand, and fearing wealth on the other, even to the extent of devouring and wasting what property they already had. In conclusion, under the influence of the CCP’s land policy, the peasants’ traditional mentality went through a period of unprecedented tumult and reformulation; at the same time, some traditional attitudes continued on and expanded.

The Republican Period Rural Reconstruction Movement’s Model of Village Transformation Yu Heping (95)

A Sketch of the Process of Issuing “Clear Trust” Stocks in 1898 Li Yu (111)

A New Interpretation of “Estimating Chinese Material Resources and Obtaining the Favor of Friendly Countries” Wang Kaixi (128)

Name vs. Substance; Politics; Personnel: Some Reflections on Studies of the History of Early Republican Shanghai Merchant Organizations Feng Xiaocai (134)

 

The Development of Studies on Li Dazhao in the Past Ten Years and A Discussion of Some Relevant Issues Wu Hanquan (146)

责任编辑：国强 最后更新：2021-05-30 19:45:19

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