《近代史研究》2007年第6期
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一、中文目录

专题论文   
日苏关系与国共的战略利益——1943年蒋介石制裁中共的策划与取消 邓 野（1）
种瓜得豆：清季外官改制的舆论及方案选择 关晓红（21）
日本的国际战略与中日战争的扩大化——论联接中日战争和太平洋战争的一个关键原因  鹿锡俊（41）
“清流”与《申报》 王维江（62）
工商团体与南京政府时期之营业税包征制 魏文享（78）
书评与文评   
另类的医疗史书写——评杨念群著《再造“病人”》  余新忠（92）
读史札记   
光绪朝“政府”词义之嬗变 王宏斌（105）
学术综述   
中国近代自由职业群体研究述评 尹 倩（110） 
“近代中国与近代文化”学术研讨会在京举行 张昭军 王立璋（120）
2006年国外出版中国近代史论著目录
 近代史研究所图书馆(122)
2006年台湾、香港、澳门地区出版中国近代史论著目录 近代史研究所图书馆(141)
《近代史研究》2007年总目（156）

 

二、中文内容提要

 

日苏关系与国共的战略利益——1943年蒋介石制裁中共的策划与取消　　邓 野（中国社会科学院近代史研究所研究员）
［内容提要］关于国民党发动的第三次反共高潮，毛泽东当年多次判断其起因主要是蒋介石相信日军即将进攻苏联。对于毛的这一判断，迄今，相关论著或者完全回避，不予论及，或者语焉不详，不能把问题说透。原因无非两点：其一，没有弄懂日苏与国共三国四方之间的战略关系；其二，没有从蒋介石那里找出相关的证据。本文将着重提出并回答这两个问题。关于此次反共高潮的结束，通常判定为7月中下旬，从现象上看，这一论点可以成立。其实，接下来蒋还制定了多个肃清或制裁陕北的计划，这些计划的制定、删改与放弃，本文亦将予以研究。简言之，国共之间的这场政治纠纷，其发生与终结，都是蒋介石基于国际战略动向的观察而做出的选择。这一过程较为集中的体现了蒋的战略视野及其对于多种战略关系的联系与权衡。
［关键词］蒋介石|日本|苏联|国共关系

 

种瓜得豆：清季外官改制的舆论及方案选择　　关晓红（中山大学历史系近代中国研究中心教授）
［内容提要］清季官制改革启动前，程序和步骤均有不同方案。选择结果对改革进程不无影响。当朝执政未能统筹全局，却照搬外国经验，从而内外官改制难以协调，督抚的双重身份又成为官制改革的症结及矛盾焦点。因改制权力频受削弱的督抚，设法图存扩张，先是多方表达自己的不满和诉求，继而利用立宪派和民众的请愿，公开向清廷施加压力。直至辛亥前夕，外官改制的最终方案仍未确定，由此引发的权与利的争斗，加速了清王朝垮台。所遗留的省级行政权力及其长官身份地位问题，成为民初割据纷争要因，且依然困扰着后来行政体制的规划者与建设者。
［关键词］官制改革|督抚|舆论|清末新政

 

日本的国际战略与中日战争的扩大化——论联接中日战争和太平洋战争的一个关键原因　　鹿锡俊（日本大东文化大学国际关系学部教授）
［内容提要］本文旨在考察日本的国际战略在联接中日战争和太平洋战争中所起到的关键作用。分析的重点包括这个国际战略所含有的五个方面：对中国问题的解决方针；对第三国的政策；对九国公约与既有世界秩序的态度；对国际形势的判断；对“中国问题”与“世界问题”相互关系的应对。文章提示：日本最初在国际战略上采取了不刺激第三国的方针，以期将战争限定在中日两国的范围内单独解决。但是，它的实际行为同它的主观意图背道而驰，不自觉地步步推动美国和国际力量走向援华抑日。在深陷困境之后，面对欧洲局势的变化，在对“东亚新秩序”的执着情结和对包括东南亚在内的“大东亚新秩序”的期待心理的推动下，日本决策层在国际战略上和中国殊途同归，确定了“国际性解决”中日战争的方向。随之，其不仅拒绝退出中国，且进一步结盟德意，刻意通过南进收一举多得之效，从而把战争从中国扩大到东南亚和太平洋。在这一过程中，日本的文职官员在很多场合冲到了军人的前面，反映出日本决策背后的深刻背景。
［关键词］日本|国际战略|中日战争|太平洋战争

 

“清流”与《申报》　　王维江（上海社会科学院历史研究所副研究员）
［内容提要］《申报》议政，是一种商业需要，目的在于赢得政府官员读者群；“清流”看《申报》，是一种政治需要，目的在于能够跟上官场上的洋务话题。体制内外的两种言路互动互利，实现双赢：《申报》获得了稳定的订户；而官员扩大了消息渠道，充实了洋务新知。但《申报》最终无法成为现代意义上的独立舆论，官员也没有突破传统的为政理念。
［关键词］“清流”|《申报》|舆论

工商团体与南京政府时期之营业税包征制　　魏文享 （华中师范大学中国近代史研究所副教授）
［内容提要］1927年，南京国民政府因应裁厘需要，开始正式征收营业税。依营业税法规定，该税本应由税务机关直接征收，但当时，地方政府及工商团体却不顾中央禁令，私下签订包征协议，普遍由工商团体代征甚至包缴营业税，以稳定裁厘后的地方财政，使包税制呈现出“团体包税”的新形态。此种情形虽然不单独存在于营业税的征收过程中，但以营业税包征最为普遍。这一现象的内在成因十分复杂，涉及中央、地方、工商团体间的利益纠葛及平衡问题，亦说明国民政府建立现代税收国家的努力遭受顿挫。
［关键词］工商团体|商会|同业公会|包征制

 

 另类的医疗史书写——评杨念群著《再造“病人”》　　余新忠

 

光绪朝“政府”词义之嬗变　　王宏斌
 

中国近代自由职业群体研究述评　　尹 倩

“近代中国与近代文化”学术研讨会在京举行　　张昭军 王立璋

2006年国外出版中国近代史论著目录　　近代史研究所图书馆

2006年台湾、香港、澳门地区出版中国近代史论著目录　　近代史研究所图书馆

《近代史研究》2007年总目
 

三、英文目录提要

Modern Chinese History Studies No.6, 2007

Sino-Soviet Relations and the Guomindang and CCP’s Strategic Interests: The Planning and Cancellation of Chiang Kai-shek’s 1943 Sanctions against the CCP Deng Ye (1)

Mao Zedong repeatedly came to the conclusion that the Guomindang launched its third anti-Communist campaign because Chiang Kai-shek believed that the Japanese would attack the USSR imminently. To this day, writers have either completely avoided mentioning this conclusion of Mao’s, or have mentioned it in only the most evasive way. There are two reasons for this: First, they have not understood the strategic relationships within the tri-national quartet of Japan, the USSR, the Guomindang and the CCP; Second, they haven’t found the relevant evidence on Chiang Kai-shek’s side. This paper will focus on raising and resolving these two issues. This anti-Communist campaign is usually considered to have come to an end in mid-to-late July. On the face of it, this stance is defensible. However, Chiang proceeded to formulate many plans to wipe out or contain the North Shaanxi Soviet. This paper will also examine how these plans were formulated, altered and abandoned. In short, this political dispute between the Guomindang and the CCP both began and ended with choices made by Chiang Kai-shek based on his observations of international strategic trends. This course of events is a relatively concentrated expression of Chiang’s strategic vision and his contact with and consideration of a variety of strategic relations.

Reaping What You Did Not Sow: Choice of Plans for Reforming the Provincial Bureaucratic System in the Qing Period and Public Reaction Guan Xiaohong (21)

On the eve of late the Qing reform of the bureaucratic system, there were a number of options under consideration for both the procedure and pace of reform, the choice of which would have a great affect on the progress of the reform. The regime failed to come up with an overall plan, and instead adopted foreign practices wholesale, and as a result the reforms of the central and provincial bureaucratic systems were not harmonized. The heart of the reform and the focus of its contradictions was the double identity of the governors and governors-general. As the reform weakened their power, the governors and governors-general sought ways to survive and expand their power. First, they began to express their dissatisfaction and grievances through various outlets. Then they took advantage of petitions to the Qing court from constitutionalists and the general populace to publicly exert pressure on the court. Right up to the eve of the 1911 Revolution, the final scheme for reforming the provincial bureaucratic system had still not been settled, and the incessant battle for power and advantage sped up the downfall of the Qing dynasty. The unresolved issues of the provincial administration’s authority and the governor’s status became the principal factors behind the endless fighting between regional regimes during the early Republican period, and continued to confound planners and builders of bureaucratic systems in subsequent regimes.

Japan’s International Strategy and the Expansion of the War in China: On a Key Factor Linking the War in China and the Pacific War Lu Xijun (41)

The aim of this article is to investigate the crucial role of Japan’s international strategy in linking the war in China with the Pacific War. The analytic focus includes five aspects of this international strategy: the guiding principles for resolving the China Problem; policies towards other nations; attitudes toward the Nine-Power Treaty and the existing international order; evaluations of the international situation; responses to the relationship between the “China Problem” and the “World Problem”. This article points out that in its international strategy, Japan first adopted a principle of not provoking other nations, in hopes of containing the war between the two countries China and Japan, and resolving the conflict on its own. However, Japan’s actual behavior was the complete opposite of this subjective intent. Quite unawares, Japan step by step drove American and international power toward the decision to aid China and contain Japan. Deep in crisis, faced with a changing situation in Europe, driven by a stubborn attachment to the “New East Asian Order” and hoping for a “New Greater East Asian Order” that included Southeast Asia, Japan’s decision makers came to the same conclusion as China on international strategy: they settled on an “International Solution” to the war between China and Japan. Thereafter, Japan not only refused to pull out from China, but went on to ally itself with Germany and Italy. Hoping to kill two birds with one stone, Japan intentionally launched a strike to the south, thereby expanding the war from China to Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Throughout this process, Japan’s civil officials frequently took the lead ahead of the military. This reflects the depth of support for this policy in Japan.

The Qingliu and Shenbao Wang Weijiang (62)

Shenbao’s political commentary was a commercial activity, the purpose of which was to attract government officials as readers. Qingliu officials read Shenbao out of political necessity, because they were trying to keep up with the discourse of Modernization in official circles. The profitable interaction of these two channels of discussion—one within the system and the other without—benefited both sides: Shenbao won its stable subscribers, and the officials expanded their access to information and enriched their knowledge of the West. However, Shenbao never emerged as an organ of public opinion in modern sense, and the officials were unable to overcome traditional ideas of rulership.

Industrial and Commercial Groups and Farming Out the Business Tax in the Nanjing Decade

Wei Wenxiang (78)

In order to eliminate the old transport duties, the Nanjing National Government started to formally levy a business tax in 1927. According to tax regulations, the business tax should have been collected directly by the tax authorities. But at the time local governments and industrial and commercial groups disregarded the law, and signed private agreements to stabilize local finances that assigned responsibility for tax revenue collection to groups such as chambers of commerce and trade associations. Thus tax farming emerged in a new guise: “Group Farming.” This situation was not unique to business tax collection, but business tax farming was its most widespread form. The internal reasons for this phenomenon were extremely complex, involving questions of conflicting interests and balance of power between the central government, local governments and the industrial and commercial groups. It also demonstrates that the National Government encountered obstacles in its effort to build a country with a modern tax system.

An Unusual Work of Medical History—— a review of Yang Nianqun’s Remaking “Patients”

Yu Xinzhong (92)

Evolution of the Term “Government” during the Guangxu Period Wang Hongbin (105)

A Review of Research on China’s Modern Professionals Yin Qian (110)

Seminar on the “Modern China and Modern Culture” Zhang Zhaojun, Wang Lizhang (120)

Catalog of Overseas Publications on Modern Chinese History in 2006 (122)

Catalog of Publications on Modern Chinese History in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao in 2006 (141)

General Table of Contents, Modern Chinese History Studies, 2007 （156）

责任编辑：国强 最后更新：2021-05-30 19:47:53

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